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Abstract
California water lawhas traditionally treated groundwater and surface water as separate resources.
The 2014 Sustainable GroundwaterManagement Act (SGMA) brokewith this tradition by requiring
groundwatermanagers to avoid significant and unreasonable adverse impacts to beneficial uses of
surfacewater. This paper considers the trajectory of this partial integration of science, law, and
resourcemanagement policy. Drawing on legal analysis and participatoryworkshopswith subject area
experts, we describe the challenges of reconciling the separate legal systems that grew out of an
artificial legal distinction between different aspects of the same resource. Our analysis offers twomain
contributions. First, it demonstrates that laws that subdivide an interconnected resource can have
legacy effects that linger long after lawmakers begin dismantling the artificial divides. Using SGMAas a
case study, the article illustrates the complexities of reconciling lawwith science, showing that
reconciliation is a process that does not endwith updating statutes, or with any other single
intervention. Second, we introduce a framework for evaluating the elements of an effort to reconcile
lawwith scientific understanding, whether that reform effort involves groundwater or some other
resource. Applying that framework helps reveal where lingering legacy effects still need to be
addressed.More generally, it reveals the need for literature addressing science-policy interactions to
devotemore attention to themultifaceted nature of law and policy reform.Much of that literature
describes policy-making in broad and undifferentiated terms, often referring simply to ‘the science-
policy interface.’But as the SGMA case study illustrates, the complex andmulti-layered nature of
policy-makingmeans that a successful reform effortmay need to addressmany science-policy
interfaces.
1. Introduction
For decades, observers have noted the close yet
troubled relationships between environmental science
and law [1]. Science and law are often intimately linked
and shape one another: many environmental laws call
for decisions grounded in ‘the best available science,’
and, in turn, legal requirements often shape scientific
research priorities [2, 3]. But the relationships are
rarely frictionless. Laws may not reflect scientific
understanding at the time they are made. And as
scientific understanding evolves, laws that originally
reflected contemporary science can become outdated.
The resulting artificial or outdated legal distinctions
can make effective natural resource management
difficult.
Partly in response to these problems, many studies
of environmental law, science, and policy have sought
to understand how science can better inform environ-
mental policy and management [4, 5]. Within this
broad arena, legal scholarship has focused on catching
law up to science—that is, on ensuring that legal deci-
sion-makers understand, and that laws are grounded
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have also focused onmaking sensible decisions in con-
texts where important scientific uncertainties remain
[8, 9]. Similarly, science and social science literature
often addresses the challenges of aligning scientific
research priorities with decision-makers’ needs,
and of establishing and maintaining communication
between researchers and policy actors [4, 5, 10].
These literatures leave a different question under-
explored: what happens when policy-makers begin to
correct artificial legal distinctions, but institutions and
practices that were built around those distinctions
remain? Put another way, how do legal systems and
management institutions respond to the legacy effects
of years of getting sciencewrong?
This article addresses these questions, using Cali-
fornia groundwater management as a case study. The
state’s laws have long drawn an artificial distinction
between surface water and groundwater, creating the
legal fiction that the two resources are distinct [11–13].
This divergence occurred even though both scientists
and lawyers have long realized it does not reflect
hydrologic reality [11, 14]. By explicitly recognizing
connections between groundwater and surface water,
California’s 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Manage-
ment Act (SGMA) [15] partially dismantled this
boundary [16]. Specifically, SGMA requires ground-
water managers to avoid ‘[d]epletions of inter-
connected surface water that have significant and
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses of the
surfacewater’ [17].
This legislative recognition of scientific reality is
only part of the course-correction process, however.
In practice, the fragmentation and separate evolution
of natural resourcemanagement systems can present a
variety of continuing challenges to more integrated
management. California exemplifies these challenges:
the separation of groundwater and surface water law
generated different, and sometimes conflicting, rules,
which were implemented by different government
entities through different processes, with no tradi-
tional venue or process for resolving conflicts.
In the environmental field, this kind of scientifi-
cally-ungrounded legal distinction is common
[3, 18, 19]. For example, jurisdictional boundaries fre-
quently cut through watersheds [20]. Distinctions
between subject areas, such as water law, land-use law,
and environmental law, artificially segment environ-
mental governance [3]. Some divisions are the una-
voidable product of needing to subdivide the world
into manageable units, but others reflect outdated sci-
entific beliefs, misunderstandings, or deliberate over-
simplifications [7]. Anywhere lawmakers attempt to
address these distinctions, the basic challenges Cali-
fornia now faces are likely to recur.
We argue that modernizing and integrating these
fragmented legal regimes requires more than just
updating the statutory framework to align with bio-
physical reality. Instead, it requires taking a compre-
hensive view of law and policy—a view that
encompasses underlying principles, related statutes,
regulations, agency practices, and institutional context
as well as core statutory requirements—and using that
comprehensive view to identify steps needed to recon-
cile science and law.We develop a framework for such
an evaluation, demonstrate its utility by applying it to
SGMA, and address its broader generalizability.
2.Methods
This article draws on legal research and participatory
workshops. The legal research, which took place both
before and after theworkshops, drew on standard legal
research methodology. Specifically, we reviewed the
SGMA statute itself, its implementing regulations,
other relevant state and federal statutes, relevant state
and federal court decisions, and secondary sources
that describe and critique these sources of law. We
used this analysis to identify areas where governing law
is relatively settled and areas where uncertainty or
disagreement remain.We complemented that analysis
with a literature review focused on technical and
scientific issues associated with surface and ground-
watermanagement.
We used participatory workshops, based on the
principle that actionable knowledge comes from inter-
action between researchers and their audiences
[21, 22], to facilitate co-production of results [23]. We
convened eighteen experts (table 1), including
groundwater scientists, technical consultants, local
government officials, legal experts, and state agency
officials, for two day-long, facilitated, discussion-
based workshops [24, 25]. We selected participants
through a purposive sampling method [26] based on
our knowledge of the field, as well as through con-
sultation with experts in California groundwater man-
agement. In particular, we designed the workshop to
include thought leaders from a range of organizational
and disciplinary perspectives.
The first workshop was framed by preliminary
presentations, which were delivered by the organizers,
on technical and legal issues associated with SGMA
and groundwater-surface water interactions. Through
facilitated discussions, the group then identified and
prioritized key unanswered questions about legal,
institutional, and technical aspects of groundwater-
surface water interactions under SGMA. We synthe-
sized the group’s identification of key issues and ques-
tions into a detailed outline, which we shared with
participants prior to the secondworkshop.
For the second workshop, we used the group’s
prioritization of issues to select case studies of emer-
gingmanagement approaches.Workshop participants
presented those case studies to the group. We also
offered hypothetical solutions for legal and technical
challenges. We used the case studies and the hypothe-
tical solutions to frame discussions of solutions to the
questions we had identified during the first workshop.
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Our goal was to understand where the group generally
agreed upon solutions to SGMA-related challenges,
what those solutions might be, and where the group
perceived there to bemajor outstanding issues without
ready solutions.
In addition to this article, our research generated
a white paper containing guidance for practi-
tioners [27].
3. Turning scientific knowledge into law: a
conceptual framework
While statutory modification is a logical initial focus
for efforts to reconcile law with science, it will often be
insufficient for effective change. Legal systems’ inte-
gration of new scientific knowledge will necessarily
occur on multiple levels, and a clearer understanding
of this reality will help those working to reconcile law
with science.
The need for multifaceted reform arises partly
from the complexity of policymaking and law. Legal
scholars often emphasize that law is more than just the
words in authoritative legal texts like constitutions,
statutes, and court decisions. Rather, laws take effect
through the interpretations and actions of a variety of
institutions, governmental and otherwise, and those
interpretations and actions often expand upon, and
sometimes differ from, the letter of written law
[28, 29]. Relatedly, administrative lawyers emphasize
that statutes are often just a starting point for the
development of legal rules, and that statutory man-
dates often need to be fleshed out through regulations,
guidance documents, agency orders, and an accumu-
lation of other discretionary decisions [30]. Reform
also is likely to be incremental, even when scientists
and policymakers alike realize that the old regime was
premised on assumptions that were irreconcilable
with science, because law is sticky [16]. People build
businesses and governance institutions in reliance on
existing legal regimes, so vested interests often support
the status quo [31].
With limited exceptions (e.g. [32]), existing litera-
ture on the interactions between science, policy, and
law, though extensive, does not address the multi-
layered legal, institutional, and political reality of nat-
ural resource policy implementation. Instead, it often
focuses on communication systems and structures
that will help deliver scientific information to policy-
makers and that will help scientists understand policy-
makers’ needs [4, 5, 10]. Other work addresses the
appropriate degree of engagement between scientists
and political decision makers, with some writers
arguing for greater engagement and others worrying
that such engagement will undercut the integrity of
scientific research [33]. Within this realm of ‘science-
policy interface’ or ‘knowledge-to-action’ research,
the category of policymaking or decision-making—
that is, the things decision-makers do in response to
scientific information—is often described in a broad
and undifferentiated way, and scholars rarely engage
systematically with the variety of mechanisms and
institutions through which law and policy take effect.
Similarly, the voluminous literature on adaptive man-
agement, though it addresses continuousmutual feed-
back between science and policy, tends to focus
on decision-making within pre-set legal structures
rather than on the elements of systematic legal
reform [34, 35].
Rather than treating the policy/action realm as a
single, undifferentiated category, theoretical and
empirical descriptions of policymaking should better
reflect the complex array of processes and decision-
makers. Describing ‘the science-policy interface’ is a
somewhat misleading oversimplification, for even a
focused effort to integrate scientific knowledge into
policy and law will involve multiple interfaces, each
involving different recipients of and pathways for sci-
entific knowledge. Science-policy interfaces is a more
accurate descriptor. There are many potential target
points for law and policy reform, and a successful
effort to reconcile law with scientific knowledge (or to
reform law formotivations unrelated to science) prob-
ably cannot target just one or two. Figure 1, below,
Table 1. Institutional affiliations of workshop participants.
Institutional affiliation Number of participants
State agency CaliforniaDepartment ofWater Resources 4
California StateWater Resources Control Board
University University of Californiaa 4





Water resources consulting firm 2
Foundation 1
a Including three groundwater scientists and one environmental law scholar.
b Three other participants were also attorneys, but not with traditional law firms. In this table they are counted based on their type of
employer.
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captures the range of options. It illustrates that a legal/
policy regime is made up of many different compo-
nents, ranging from broad governance principles to
the discretionary actions of individual resource
managers.
This conceptual framework has two important
implications. First, it provides an architecture for
efforts to address long-entrenched laws that are incon-
sistent with scientific knowledge. Second, it provides a
rough checklist for evaluating efforts that already are
underway.
4. SGMAandCalifornia’s partial
integration of groundwater and surface
water law
To illustrate the utility of this conceptual framework,
we focus on the evolving law of groundwater and
surface water in California. To provide background
and a point of comparison, we begin by discussing the
pre-SGMA legal regime. We then explain where
SGMA closes gaps and where continuing challenges
remain.
4.1. The pre-SGMA legal regime
Throughout the United States, groundwater law has
long lagged behind surface water law [36]. California is
no exception, and while the pre-SGMA legal systems
that allocated California’s surface water and ground-
water include areas of consistency, they also created
major, and deeply entrenched, gaps and conflicts.
Many of the gaps and conflicts have roots in Cali-
fornia’s traditional systems of water rights. Both
surface water and groundwater rights systems include
usage rights based on ownership of land adjacent to
the resource (riparian or overlying rights) and usage
rights based on prior appropriation of water (table 2).
California’s courts, agencies, and watermanagers have
struggled to reconcile rights grounded in these differ-
ent fundamental principles [37]. Even when rights
share a basic operating principle—whether that prin-
ciple is shared use or temporal priority—data gaps and
a lack of active management inhibit effective integra-
tion of legal regimes [38].
Beyond water rights law, other state and federal
statutes affect water management in California, and
these laws also tended to treat the two resources sepa-
rately. With relatively rare exceptions [39], federal sta-
tutes like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) apply primarily to surface water
management, as do their state-law counterparts. Reg-
ulation of groundwater extraction has not tradition-
ally been a focus of federal orCalifornia statutory law.
The divides that traditionally separated ground-
water and surface water management are institutional
and procedural as well as doctrinal. For years, water
rights regimes for groundwater and surface water have
been implemented through separate institutions
(table 2). The State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) is California’s primary surface water reg-
ulator, and oversees both water rights and water qual-
ity protection. But until SGMA’s passage, no state
agency regulated groundwater use, except where
groundwater was pumped from so-called ‘known and
definite channels’ [11, 16].
Figure 1.Potential interfaces between scientific knowledge and legal and policy reform. This diagramobviously is simplified, and
additional feedback loops andmore complex relationships, which could be described inmore detailed empirical studies beyond the
scope of this work, will exist within and between the boxes described here. Additionally, because governance institutions are often
created and their practices are often partially controlled throughwritten law, therewill be overlap between our two general categories
of interfaces.
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Table 2. Summary comparison ofwater rights, governance institutions, and degree of state and federal oversight over decisionmaking for
surfacewater and groundwater inCalifornia (pre-SGMA).
Element Surfacewater Groundwater
Water rights Rights based on ownership of
adjacent land (correlative)
Riparian rights:Waterfront landowners
are entitled to use a reasonable share
of the naturalflow from the adjacent
waterway on that land. Shortages are
shared equitably among riparian
users.
Overlying rights:Owners of land overlying
a groundwater basin are entitled to
pump a reasonable share of the renew-
able groundwater for use on that land.
Shortages are shared equitably among
overlying users.
Rights based on the prior
appropriation of water
(first in time=first in
right)
Appropriative rights: Surface water that
is surplus to the needs of riparian
usersmay be diverted and put to rea-
sonable non-riparian uses.When
there is not enoughwater in awater-
way to satisfy all appropriative users’
needs,more senior appropriators
(thosewith older rights)may take the
full amount of their water right
beforemore junior appropriators
may take anywater. Since late 1914,
all new appropriative rights have
required approval by the SWRCB.
Appropriative rights:Groundwater that is
surplus to the needs of overlying users
may be pumped and put to reasonable
use on others’ landswithin the basin or
for export outside the basin.When
there is not enough groundwater avail-
able to satisfy all appropriative users’
needs,more senior appropriatorsmay
take the full amount of their water right
beforemore junior appropriatorsmay
take anywater.No state approval is
required for appropriative use of
groundwater.
Management institutions Surfacewater has beenmanaged by a
range of actors including local water
agencies, theCaliforniaDepartment
ofWater Resources (manager of the
StateWater Project), theUS Bureau
of Reclamation (manager of the Cen-
tral Valley Project), and private
entities.
Groundwater has beenmanaged pri-




Regulation ofwater rights The SWRCBdirectly regulates ‘post-
1914’ appropriative surfacewater
rights and plays an oversight and
enforcement role for all surface water
rights.
Groundwater use regulation has largely
been left to local governments. Coun-
ties generally require permits for well
construction ormodification and have
sometimes imposed restrictions on
groundwater extraction and use, espe-
cially out-of-area exports. A few local-
ities have imposed pumping fees or
other general restrictions. However,
local regulatory activity has historically
beenminimal inmany areas of the
state.
Regulation ofwater quality The SWRCB implements and enforces
state and federal surface water and
drinking water quality requirements.
The SWRCB implements and enforces
state groundwater quality and state and
federal drinking water quality require-
ments. TheUS Environmental Protec-
tionAgency and the stateDepartment
of Toxic Substances Control also reg-




State and federal wildlife agencies
implement and enforce the state and
federal endangered species acts and
other laws that protect surface-water
dependent ecosystems, species, and
environmental values.
Traditionally, there areminimal intersec-
tions between federal and state habitat/
wildlife protection laws and ground-
watermanagement.
Degree of state oversight over decision-making Significant state oversight Minimal state oversight
Degree of federal involvement in
decision-making
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Instead, groundwater use regulation has long been
left to local governments and the courts. Some local
governments used their authority to create sophisti-
cated and successful groundwater management
regimes [40]. But in much of the state—particularly in
the state’s major agricultural regions, where ground-
water use is heaviest—local regulatory activity has
been minimal [41]. Similarly, while courts have adju-
dicated rights in some groundwater basins, few major
agricultural groundwater basins have been adjudi-
cated [42].
4.2. The impact of SGMA
New legislation is often a key mechanism for bringing
law in line with scientific understanding. That was true
with SGMA, which explicitly acknowledges ground-
water-surface water interconnections and compels
groundwater managers to consider these interconnec-
tions. Specifically, the statute sets a state policy of
managing groundwater resources ‘sustainably for
long-term reliability and multiple economic, social,
and environmental benefits for current and future
beneficial uses’ [43]. Sustainability means avoiding
‘undesirable results,’ including ‘[d]epletions of inter-
connected surface water that have significant and
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses of the
surface water’ [44] (figure 2). Regulations adopted
under SGMA define ‘interconnected surface water’ as
‘surface water that is hydraulically connected at any
point by a continuous saturated zone to the underlying
aquifer and the overlying surface water is not comple-
tely depleted’ [45]. ‘Beneficial uses’ include supporting
groundwater-dependent ecosystems as well as human
consumptive and non-consumptive uses of surface
water [46].
SGMA also is compelling the creation of new agen-
cies, regulations, guidance, decision-making pro-
cesses, and institutional relationships, all of which will
need to address groundwater-surface water interac-
tions (among other matters). New local groundwater
sustainability agencies (GSAs) must develop and
implement groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs)
for groundwater basins prioritized by the California
Department of Water Resources (DWR) [47]. GSPs
must demonstrate how GSAs will manage ground-
water to avoid undesirable depletions of surface water.
SGMA also requires DWR to develop groundwater
regulations, provide technical assistance, and review
the sufficiency of GSPs [48]. The SWRCB is respon-
sible for intervening, and potentially taking over man-
agement, in a groundwater basin if the two agencies
deem a GSP or its implementation insufficient [49].
Both state agencies thus have significant new roles in
groundwater regulation; they are no longer limited to
their traditional surfacewater domains.
SGMA therefore takes significant action at some of
the interfaces identified by our conceptual framework
(figure 1). But, as explained below, the process of
reconciling law with scientific understanding is just
beginning.
4.3. Continuing challenges
While SGMA takes important steps to reconcile legal
structures with hydrologic reality, many challenges
remain. Drawing upon our workshops, where discus-
sion focused on continuing challenges, and on our
independent research and analysis, the discussion
below summarizes the steps not yet taken toward
effective integration.
We stress that our analysis is not intended as an
indictment of SGMA’s authors. Ambiguity is inevi-
table in any law of such sweeping scope, for legislators
cannot foresee, let alone resolve, every complication
with one bill. That is particularly true for a statute, like
SGMA, that attempted to address many issues;
improving management of groundwater-surface
water interactions was just one of the statute’s attemp-
ted reforms. Additionally, a statute providing more
extensive mandates for managing groundwater-sur-
face water interactions might not have survived the
legislative process, because strong interests had
evolved in reliance on the old distinctions [16]. Legis-
lating involves compromise and political constraints,
and those inherent limitations will complicate any
effort to integrate scientific understanding into statu-
tory law.
4.3.1. Interfaces with written law
As discussed above, SGMA creates new statutory
mandates, and it also has generated new implementing
regulations. That means it has addressed, albeit not
completely, items 2 and 4 from figure 1. But our
workshops and research revealed that items 1 and 3—
changing underlying legal principles and addressing
intersections with other statutes—remain significant
challenges.
Figure 2.Undesirable results to be avoided under SGMA. Source: CaliforniaDepartment ofWater Resources.
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4.3.1.1. Revising underlying legal principles
In any legal regime, specific statutory terms are likely
both to be grounded in and to interact with a set of
basic legal principles, which may flow from constitu-
tional authority or from traditional common law. That
is true in California, where water law builds from
several basic principles—some of which conflict.
Bringing together groundwater and surface water law
will require resolving some of these conflicts, yet
SGMA leaves that task largely unaddressed.
Some of these basic legal principles come from the
underlying property rights regime. As discussed
above, California law recognizes multiple types of
water usage rights, and some of those rights are groun-
ded in temporal priority while others are grounded in
geographic proximity (table 2). Reconciling ground-
water and surface water management will sometimes
require reconciling those competing principles. For
example, overlying groundwater users and appro-
priative surface water users will sometimes claim the
same water—particularly as climate change and reg-
ulatory limitations lead to increased scarcity and
competition.
Complicating these potential conflicts is another
underlying principle. Because groundwater and sur-
face water rights are property rights, both are pro-
tected by state and federal constitutional prohibitions
of ‘taking’ property without just compensation [36].
Consequently, when regulators attempt to reconcile
competing groundwater and surface water right
claims, or when they attempt to reconcile either type
of claim with environmental protections, some water
users may argue that their property has been
taken [36].
SGMAdoes not address these potential conflicts. It
expressly disclaims altering surface water or ground-
water rights [50]. It also states that GSPs are not
obliged to address undesirable results—including sur-
face water impacts—that occurred prior to 1, January
2015 [51]. In combination, this language gives surface
water users no new basis for challenging pre-2015
pumping, unless effects occur after SGMA’s effective
date. But the language does not eliminate the possibi-
lity of challenges under other legal theories, or of tak-
ings claims. Consequently, SGMA remains agnostic
on the resolution of old conflicts between ground-
water and surface water users, and legal uncertainty
remains.
SGMA also leaves residual legal uncertainty about
two other underlying principles of California water
law. California’s public trust doctrine establishes the
general principle that navigable waterways should be
managed, where feasible, to serve public values like
environmental protection [52]. California’s reason-
able use doctrine provides additional authority for
environmental protection [53, 54]. There are strong
arguments that these laws apply to groundwater uses
that deplete surface waterways [55], but SGMA says
nothing explicit about the interrelationships between
groundwater regulation and the public trust doctrine
or reasonable use doctrine. Consequently, the exact
nature of the resulting legal requirements awaits clar-
ification through additional administrative action, leg-
islation, or the courts.
4.3.1.2. Addressing intersections with other statutes
Any new statutory reform is likely to affect other pre-
existing laws. Continuing questions about water
rights, takings doctrine, reasonable use, and the public
trust doctrine exemplify this type of challenge. Our
workshops and research also identified another major
set of challenges deriving from other legal regimes.
Federal and state laws including the ESA and the Clean
Water Act protect aquatic ecosystems and water
quality [56]. But the intersections between these laws
and groundwater use and management remain
unsettled even after SGMA’s passage.
The ESA, which has been centrally important to
California surface water management, exemplifies this
uncertainty [13]. It prohibits actions that ‘take’ endan-
gered and some threatened species, and takes can
occur through habitat modifications that ‘harm’ spe-
cies [57, 58]. Scientists understand that groundwater
can be important to many threatened and endangered
species [59]. The possibility of prohibited takes there-
fore seems obvious. But even if scientists (and law-
makers) understand that groundwater and surface
water are generally interconnected, the diffuse nature
of the impact means that they may not be able to link
particular groundwater users’ activities to particular
environmental effects in surface waterways [60]. The
resulting uncertainty is not unique to the ESA. Wher-
ever laws require showing some causal connection
between regulated actions and environmental harms,
the scientific uncertainties surrounding groundwater
management are likely to create legal risk.
SGMA says little about managing these intersec-
tions. By requiring sustainable groundwater manage-
ment and by prohibiting new significant and
unreasonable impacts to surface waterways and sur-
face water users, SGMA advances environmental pro-
tection. But it establishes neither specific standards
nor tailored procedures for integrating groundwater
into the larger web of statutory environmental law.
4.3.2. Interfaces with institutions and practices
Even if the doctrinal quandaries described above were
resolved, integrating groundwater and surface water
management would still raise major institutional and
procedural challenges. While SGMA takes steps
toward addressing these challenges—to use figure 1’s
framework, it creates new agencies (5) and new
decision-making venues and procedures (6) and is
beginning to forge new networks (7) and facilitate
institutional learning (8)—significant challenges
remain.
As mentioned above, management institutions for
groundwater and surface water have evolved in
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disparate ways. In California, groundwater regulation
and management have been championed as local pre-
rogatives, while surface water regulation is handled
primarily by the SWRCB (table 3). Similarly, while a
state agency—DWR—is one of California’s largest
surface water suppliers, no state agency supplies
groundwater.
These traditional responsibilities have con-
sequences for managerial networks and experience.
For surface water, significant interactions of the
SWRCB andDWRwithwildlife agencies are common.
For groundwater, analogous interactions have been
relatively rare. SGMA changes this status quo by giving
the state explicit oversight and intervention authority
over local groundwater management and by expand-
ing the responsibilities of local managers. Never-
theless, the old institutional arrangements have legacy
effects that will complicate implementation of the
new. Indeed,much of the discussion in our workshops
focused on the challenges and opportunities created
by the shifting institutional landscape.
One key legacy effect involves the distribution of
expertize. Because no state agency previously asserted
authority to manage or regulate groundwater-surface
water interactions, there is no state entity with experi-
ence doing so. Instead, DWR and the SWRCB will
need to develop expertize and translate technical
knowledge into effective oversight and intervention
programs. For local governments, the challenges could
be even greater. Many GSAs are forming in areas
where local governments have never regulated water
use (beyond straightforward well permitting). And
local governments often face challenges funding
governance of any kind [61]. Consequently, the insti-
tutional capacity necessary for managing ground-
water-surface water interactions must be built from
the ground up at multiple levels, sometimes under
severe funding and resource constraints [62].
A related challenge is the lack of established
human networks and relationships. Effective regula-
tion typically requires discretion, communication,
diplomacy, negotiation, trust, and improvisation [63].
Effective regulators often rely on relationships with
other agencies, advocacy groups, and regulated enti-
ties to navigate technical and resource challenges. In
an established arena like surface water management,
those networks are often well-developed. When
groundwater-surface water challenges arise, however,
both regulators and those they regulate may not know
where to begin or whom to contact. And while key
SGMA deadlines require quick action, processes for
responding to these challenges are still under
development.
4.4. Remaining gaps
In summary, reconcilingCalifornia lawwith the reality
of groundwater-surface water interconnection is a
complex, multifaceted process, and removing the
legacies of traditional legal divides will require inter-
vention at many levels of law- and policy-making.
Table 4 illustrates this complexity, comparing SGMA’s
reforms and the remaining gaps and challenges to the
conceptual framework introduced in Part 3.
5.Drawing broader lessons fromSGMA
California water law and management are distinctive,
and the specific challenges would differ for other
attempts to address gaps between law and science.
Another reform statute might be clear on underlying
principles but vague on specific substantive mandates.
Or the substantive mandates might be clear while
decision-making processes and agency responsibilities
are left undefined. The only near-universal gap is likely
to be the challenge of creating institutional memory.
Nevertheless, the presence of legacy effects and the
need for a multilayered response are likely to arise
anywhere policymakers seek to reconcile law with
science. The basic evaluative framework presented
here can help scholars understand what has been
accomplished and where major work remains, and
help policymakers plot courses forward.
The framework also has utility for researchers
seeking to understand environmental science-policy-
law interfaces. By integrating the notion of a multi-
faceted set of science-policy interfaces into discussions
of science, policy, and law, it can help scholars and
practitioners think beyond a myopic focus on legisla-
tive change as they work to reconcile law with science.
For researchers who are concerned with the
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effectiveness of science-policy communication sys-
tems, differentiating among interfaces will matter,
because communication systems that work for one
decision-making body, such as a legislature, may not
work for others such as agencies or courts. For
researchers focused on the appropriate degree of
engagement between scientists and political sphere
[33], the different interfaces again matter, because
some policymaking entities are more political than
others. And for researchers focused on adaptive man-
agement, the differentiation again matters, because
some forms of policymaking will be more adaptive
than others. In short, while engaging with the
complexity of law- and policy-making realms will
complicate analyses of science-policy interfaces, it also
canmake those analyses richer andmore valuable.
6. Conclusion
For California water management, SGMA’s acknowl-
edgment of groundwater-surface water interconnec-
tions is like the Berlin Wall coming down. After over a
century, the most important and frequently-criticized
boundary in California water law is crumbling. But
just as the Berlin Wall’s fall set in motion a long and
difficult integration process, California too will need
Table 4. SGMA’s role in reforming regulation andmanagement of groundwater-surface water interconnections.
Potential elements of reform SGMA’s role Remaining gaps
Written law 1. Changing/creating
fundamental principles
– Acknowledges the interconnection
of groundwater and surface water
systems andmanagement
– SGMAdoes not change/integrate the




– Requires groundwatermanagers to
avoid depletions of surfacewater that
have ‘significant and unreasonable’
impacts on surfacewater users, where
those impacts occur after 1,
January 2015
– SGMA leaves conflicts arising from
past impacts to be resolved under
other laws
– SGMAdoes not require surfacewater
managers to avoid significant and





– Acknowledges water rights law,
exempts GSPs from state environ-
mental review, and requires con-
sistencywith local land-use planning
by cities and counties
– SGMA is largely silent with respect
the public trust doctrine, takings doc-
trine, and statutory environmental




– AssignsDWR responsibility for creat-
ing implementing regulations and
guidance
– SGMA, its implementing regulations,
and related guidance documents do






– Mandates the creation ofGSAs – SGMAdoes not address the ground-
watermanagement responsibilities of
other local, state, or federal agencies
– Assigns new groundwatermanage-





– MakesGSPs andDWRand SWRCB
processes the venues for key decisions
– SGMAallows but does not compel
surfacewatermanagers, land-use reg-
ulators, and federal resource agencies
to participate inGSP creation and
implementation.





– Authorizes DWR to support local
capacity-building
– SGMAdoes not compel communica-
tion betweenGSAs or state agencies
and surfacewatermanagers or federal
resource agencies.
– Compels some communication
betweenGSAs,DWR, and the
SWRCB
– Compels some communication
among nearbyGSAs
– Compels some communication
betweenGSAs and local land-use




– Creates new responsibilities, which
will spur learning.
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years to reconcile legal and management systems that
spent decades in artificial separation.
This article has emphasized the challenges facing
legal and management systems that attempt to move
past such artificial legal distinctions. Using the case of
water management in California, we have demon-
strated that many levels of reform will be necessary for
overcoming the challenges arising from gaps between
scientific knowledge and policy, and we have created a
framework for assessing which of those levels a part-
icular reform effort addresses and where the greatest
continuing challenges remain.While the gaps faced by
other reform efforts will be different, identifying them
will be central to the process of moving past the legacy
effects of legal fictions and towards policy that better
reflects scientific reality.
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